them. So Kant too, like Addison, endorsed absolute novelty as a condition on creative genius.
Were we to continue through the 18 th and into the 19 th century, we would find much of the same. Most theories of creativity from this time are, like those of Plato,
Addison and Kant, theories of genius. From the ancient roots in Plato and Longinus, to the German idealists after Kant, to the romantics, there is an emphasis on radical originality, innate cognitive capacity, and irrationality.
It is an understatement to say that these philosophers offered insights into the creation of art: much of their work is essential for the development of modern philosophical aesthetics. However, they tended, explicitly and otherwise, to mystify creativity in a way that thwarts further analysis. The Platonic view chalks creativity up to divine inspiration, stripping the responsibility from the creator and tagging creativity as no more explicable than divine intervention. On neo-Longinian views such as Addison's, creativity results from a native disposition towards genius. Kant's view rejects creative use of rules or constraints, requiring absolute novelty.
If one were to take any of these views as a kind of explanatory metric for creativity, the prospects for explanation would look grim. They leave us with little illumination regarding what the phenomenon of creativity is, and which features of the phenomenon are the ones that underwrite its importance to art, science, and the lot of human life. And the features that do get the attention are treated in such a way that mystery is compounded rather than removed.
Here are three common features.
Creation ex nihilo:
Creative ideas, tradition has often had it, come from nowhere. This derives, it seems, from the fact that creative Fs are novel Fs and the supposition that novelty, if it is genuine, is entirely new. It is of course another step or two to the inference that novel Fs come from nowhere. Suffice it to say that theorists of creativity-Addison and Kant are both examples-have in fact made such inferences, and studies of creativity have suffered (or simply not occurred) as a result.
Flash phenomenology:
Creative ideas come to us, just like that, as we say.
This phenomenology is what motivates the Platonic view and its contemporary adaptations. Ideas that come to us in a flash are not ones that we deliberately form and thus are not ones for which we are responsible. Who or what is? Gods. Muses.
A euphoric drug trip. And so on. This is discouraging if one wants an analytic or naturalistic explanation of creativity.
Incubation: According to a 4 stage model of creativity endorsed by a number of natural scientists and psychologists-including Hermann von Helmholtz, Henri
Poincaré, Arthur Koestler, Graham Wallas, Jacques Hadamard-the initial conscious, preparatory stage of creativity is followed by an unconscious stage of cognitive processing. 6 The phenomenon is a familiar one. One is consciously struggling with a problem and then leaves it aside for something else. Upon return to the problem…Eureka!...one has the needed insight that is the solution or quickly takes one to the solution. Something important, it seems, happens during this unconscious period of incubation. The creative insight from this stage is then subjected to evaluation and criticism in the final stage.
Analyses of incubation appeal to Freudian egos or unconscious automata, typically focusing on the seemingly random and uncontrolled combination of ideas. Picasso as the departure point for an analysis of creativity increases the complexity of the task right from the gates. Second, creativity, and this too is understandable, is typically explained from within the context of some particular artistic (or scientific)
domain. So many a book has been written on musical genius or, even more specifically, the creativity of Bach or Mozart. This too may be problematic, since it is difficult to distinguish the properties that are specific to the creativity (whatever that should turn out to be) from those that are features of the artistic domain or genre.
Creativity does not occur in a vacuum, so context-specificity is not unmotivated. But one does better to isolate the general phenomenon, if there is one. Finally, theorists often fail to make an important distinction. To what categories of thing do we attribute 'creativity'? We talk about creative artworks. We talk about creative artistic processes. And we talk about creative artists. Are creativity attributions the same, no matter the kind of attributee? And is there one kind of attribution that is fundamental?
The following account attempts to identify the fundamentals of creativity and its situation in a broader theory of aesthetics. The underlying spirit is minimal, beginning at the bottom rather than the top, and pragmatist, taking actual critical and appreciative practice as a theoretical constraint. A theory of art must take as its objects of inquiry and analysis whatever our best practices of criticism and appreciation take as their objects. "Ontology of art is in this way answerable to epistemology of art," as David Davies puts the point. 9 This is endorsed as a general methodological principle. Call it, following Davies, the pragmatic constraint.
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The account centres around answering the question of attribution. To what category or categories of things do we properly attribute creativity? The suggestion is that creativity is, most basically, attributed to a process which culminates in an accomplishment. The next step then, is to say what typifies the artistic creative process, and how this is informed by and informs philosophical aesthetics. Just these few steps take us far.
II. The question of attribution
Is there one category of thing most basic for predication of creativity? We have three candidates: persons, products, and processes.
Persons
As suggested in the introduction, historically, the bulk of studies of creativity have been studies of radically creative persons, geniuses. This is perhaps reasonable Beardsley writes, "is independent of the manner of production, even of whether the work was produced by an animal or by a computer or by a volcano or by a falling slop-bucket."
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Gaut and Livingston take Beardsley's strong anti-intentionalism to be one of the movements of 20 th century aesthetics and criticism which contributed to a revitalization of formalism and, in turn, to the "occlusion of creativity". "In the New
Criticism's break with both common-sense biographical criticism and those versions of biographical criticism based on existentialism, hermeneutics, and phenomenology, a leading idea was that an appropriate form of aesthetic appreciation requires the critic to focus entirely on the finished text's or other artistic structure's inherent, artistically relevant features… Facts about the text's provenance were to be set aside, especially 12 Wimsatt and Beardsley, 'The Intentional Fallacy' 13 Beardsley, 'On the Creation of Art', 302. 14 Beardsley, ibid., 301.
whenever such facts were a matter of the "private" psychology of the creator, held to be unknowable or irrelevant." 15 Structuralism and post-structuralism, although at odds with New Criticism in other ways, nonetheless shared this, one of its central tenets: the artist and the circumstances of artistic creation are not aesthetically or critically relevant. This broad anti-intentionalism long dissuaded the attention of aestheticians from the creation of art.
We should distinguish product approaches to aesthetic value from product approaches to creativity. 16 Anti-intentionalism is more typically presented as a theory of the former kind. 17 And indeed it is as a theory of aesthetic value, sometimes termed 'aesthetic empiricism', that it is more plausible. 18 There is an obvious sense in which the work may become overshadowed, in criticism or evaluation, by biographical information about the artist and her modes of production. So there is something to be said for isolating just the work and its perceptible properties, as both the anti-intentionalist and formalist suggest. 19 The relevant question, of course, is whether this is the correct or best method of aesthetic evaluation and appreciation.
This question, at the centre of a long standing debate, will not be addressed
here. There is, however, one type of view in opposition to a product approach to aesthetic value that provides some insight on how one might respond to productapproaches to creativity. A number of ontologies of art take artworks to be, in some sense, events. According to Gregory Currie, for example, artworks are the discovery, by an artist, of a structure (of colours, sounds, words, and so on) by way of a certain heuristic path. As such, the mode of discovery, how the artist produces the work in question, is partly constitutive of the work; artworks are thus event-types. 20 David
Davies argues instead that artworks are event-tokens; they are performances which include the genetic actions which culminate in the end product. For Davies, the latter provides the 'focus of appreciation', which embodies the creative achievement of the artist. 21 Both ontologies directly oppose any broad product approach, since the artwork is not exhausted by the formal properties of the finished product. Beardsley's position seems to be a consequence of his theoretical commitments, as captured by the following line of reasoning.
(P1) If some F is a feature of or includes features of artistic process or intention then F is not aesthetically relevant.
(P2) Creativity is relevant in aesthetic evaluation and critical discussion of art.
(C) So, creativity is not a feature of and does not include features of artistic process or intention.
(P1) is just a rough articulation of Beardsley's anti-intentionalism. (P2) is motivated by the fact-which Beardsley acknowledges-that art appreciators and critics alike talk about creativity in their evaluations of artworks. This fact also survives rational reflection, thus meeting the pragmatic constraint. The conclusionwhich is the negative component of horn (b) of the dilemma-follows straightforwardly from (P1) and (P2). The argument is thus valid, but the conclusion counterintuitive. Let us explore some cases that underwrite that counter intuition, and then reconsider the premises.
We are standing before an early impressionist painting, say Monet's on. To make sense of the creativity of these works, one must say something about the genetic processes from which they resulted. To overlook details of the genetic process is to overlook the creativity in the works. It is thus hard to swallow the conclusion that the artist's creative process is not (at least partly) constitutive of the creativity of her artwork in the light of cases like these.
(C) is thus, as initially expected, to be doubted. Observing our practices, creativity does include and indeed perhaps just is the features of artistic production and intention. The anti-intentionalist, however, reaches (C) as a natural extension of his view, as embodied in (P1). And here lies the dilemma. Coupling (P2)-the rationally considered intuition that creativity does matter to aesthetic evaluationwith (P1) the anti-intentionalist is stuck with (C). He thus must embrace horn (b):
creativity is not located in artistic process but solely in the finished work and our experience with it. The product approach may instead deny (P2) and opt for horn (a). This is to admit that creativity involves features of artistic process and intention while denying the aesthetic relevance of those features, and thus, of creativity. This choice comes at the cost of inconsistency with appreciative and critical practice.
The anti-intentionalist is stuck with one or the other option in virtue of his commitment to (P1). This looks problematic for a product approach to creativity and, Monet's thought process: perhaps he intended to capture an impression, an instant rather than just a place; he thus chose an instant before him and then attempted to depict it is as seen, in its natural light. One might also mention how Monet broke from his own tradition, both in intention and action: the goals of impressionists were consciously at odds with artistic tradition and their works manifest this fact. If it is true that someone has been running for half an hour, then it must be true that he has been running for every period within that half-hour. But even if it is true that a runner has run a mile in four minutes, it cannot be true that he has run a mile in any period which is a real part of that time, although it remains true that he was running, or that he was engaged in running a mile during any substretch of those four minutes…It appears, then, that running and its kind go on in time in a homogeneous way; any part of the process is of the same nature as the whole. Not so with running a mile or writing a letter; they also go on in time, but they proceed toward a terminus which is logically necessary to their being what they are. Somehow this climax casts its shadow backwards, giving a new color to all that went before. that an artist has created an artwork over a year's time, it will not be true that she has created the work at any proper part of that time (although we can naturally say that she was engaged in creating during those times). And a creative process is culminating: only when an artist has succeeded in making a work, can we say that she has created art. That is, it is only then that the accomplishment "casts its shadow backwards" upon the process that begot it, and then that we can attribute creativity to the artist's activities.
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Understanding artistic creativity in this way has its flaws. Accomplishments, and more generally events, are ordinarily interpreted as independent or separate occurrences: she accomplished such-and-such, this (event) occurred. So our speech at least indicates that we take such events to be the results of processes, not the processes themselves. Moreover, describing an F as a process, as contrasted with describing it as an event, contextualizes the parts of F; it is thus understood as having stages, each of which is contextually situated between prior stages and stages forthcoming. Second, accomplishments necessarily involve a terminus. And at least typically, this terminus is consciously targeted: writing a letter, running a mile, and baking a cake all have a clear culmination occurrently tokened in the mind of the accomplisher. The latter is less true for artistic creative accomplishment, if accomplishment is the right category. An artist will rarely have in mind such a clearly defined terminus. He may have some emotion he wishes to express or idea to represent or medium to explore, but the finishing point or product, when it arrives, is largely unforeseen. It is an open question whether this makes creativity a special kind of accomplishment, or of a distinct category.
The forgoing analysis clarifies some of the special, fundamental features of artistic processes and the terms used to describe them. The identified features imply some desiderata for an ontology of creativity. Creativity is not an homogeneous object, property or event. Nor is it wholly located at one time or other. Finally, it involves both the culminating event and the stages that lead up to that event.
'Process' likely remains the best choice of term, but 'accomplishment' brings out the fact that creative processes are ones that process towards some end. Without the end, the process is not a creative one; and without the process, there is no end. Artistic creativity is thus a spatio-temporal package, perduring towards and until the culminating artwork is made.
This approach comports well with our practices of criticism and appreciation, and for the same reasons that the product approach failed. We do not, when attributing creativity to some work of art, attribute it only to the product before us, that is, the manifest properties. Our appreciation is (partly) of the artist's having undergone a certain process to make that product. And moreover, our practice acknowledges the fact that the product possesses interesting properties because there was a special process that generated it. Thus we value genetic processes not merely as instrumental to some end. As Richard Wollheim has it, appreciating a work of art is to attempt to retrieve the process that generated it. When engaging an artwork, we 
III. Conditions on creative process
Creativity is a process, but what kind of process is it? One can read studies and theories of creative process written by artists, art theorists, critics, art teachers, philosophers, psychologists, business management firms and self-help publications, among others. It might be hard to see, if one selects two books from two of these approaches, how they are even talking about the same phenomenon. How, then, can one say something general about the processes to which we rightly attribute creativity, given volumes of such theoretical variety? The answer: toss them out. Reinvention has its advantages. Rather than incorporate case studies of geniuses and analyses of creativity in narrow artistic and scientific domains, one does better to begin with minimal conceptualizations of creative process.
Agency
What, at minimum, characterizes a creative process? First, a creative process needs a processor, and one with agency: we do not attribute creativity in absence of a responsible agent. Consider our linguistic intuitions on the following. If you were to say to me, 'That sunset is creative', I might pour you another drink or nod out of charity, but I could rightly take issue with your use of the term 'creative.' Sunsets may be beautiful or vibrant or stunning, but not creative. Your utterance is thus conceptually problematic, and for the same reason that the following is problematic.
"The Starry Night is creative but no one is responsible for it." After a moment's reflection, the misuse of 'creativity' reveals itself. Creative artworks are things that are done and made, and for which we praise their makers. The processes that generate them involve intentional agency and it is this process, at least in part, for which we praise the agent. This implies that the process must depend in some nontrivial way upon that agency. We do not appropriately praise (any more than we blame) agents for processes out of their control. We capture this intuition with a simple condition on creativity; call it the agency condition. Some F is creative only if F counterfactually depends upon the agency of an agent A.
The notion of agency at work and the relation between F and A will, for a complete analysis of creativity, need to be made precise. Philosophers typically require a cognitive and deliberative capacity for agency; while cognitive scientists require less, perhaps only self-governing or self-moving autonomous behaviour. The strength of agency at work in the agency condition depends upon what one thinks about creativity and responsibility, and how cognitive a phenomenon one takes it to be. Given an interest primarily in artistic creativity, how responsible are artists for their work? Do they foresee the end results in detail? Do they have a clear problem in mind? A clear strategy or method? How many accidents do we allow before we strip the attribution of creativity and call it a mere happy accident instead? Answers to some of these questions may be obvious; others are not. But they are the questions that a theory of creativity must answer to build a minimal model of creative process.
Agency is fundamental to creative processes, artistic or otherwise. An agency condition is thus specified as one necessary condition for the concept, without being sharpened further. Perhaps, on first glance, this characterizes paradigmatic cases of radical creativity or genius. But specifying categorical novelty as a condition on general creativity has its problems.
First, the suggestion is simply incomplete. One needs to specify the sense in which a creative F is novel simpliciter, answering at least the following questions. can think depends upon this profile. Finally, the actions one performs, and indeed the actions that one can perform, depend upon one's cognitive profile and the skills that one possesses (among other situational and environmental circumstances). Now, 30 One might worry that this value neutrality is inconsistent with the arguments offered in II. above. Recall that the process approach was partly justified by appealing to the fact that in appreciating and criticising art, we value processes intrinsically, not merely instrumentally (and moreover, the person approach was criticized oppositely). But one can maintain that creative processes are valued for their own sake, without committing to value being a necessary condition or constitutive feature of creative processes. The process is just whatever it is (and a few plausible conditions are being suggested here), and may thus be valued because it is a thing of that kind (i.e. meets the conditions specified). This is distinct from making value itself a constitutive condition for a concept of creativity. Such a modal condition accommodates the intuition that a creative process seems typified by changes in an actual cognitive profile which, in turn, enable changes to the corresponding modal cognitive profile. A cognitive profile can be individuated at lesser or greater fineness of grain. The level of mental tokens (and individual actions) is likely too fine, as some thoughts or actions will be relevant to the possibility of a creative advance, while others may be causally efficacious but clearly not necessary. More coarsely, cognitive profiles can be individuated at the level of overall organization, how a set of thoughts and actions relate with one another, and with certain circumstances. This would be in line with the general process conceptualization of creativity; for any creative process, there will be an organization of thoughts and actions essential to that process, a kind of heuristic path that leads to the culminating accomplishment.
A modal condition could be finessed along a number of dimensions, but some condition like it, broadly construed, looks promising. Combined with agency and novelty, it provides a minimal characterization of a creative process, emphasizing that creative accomplishment requires cognitive change on the part of an agent. This implies-as the next step for an analysis of the creative process-the development of a cognitive architecture of creativity. Contrary to much of theoretical and popular tradition-which talks about the creative process and the stages of creativitycreative thinking does not consist in one cognitive capacity or one set of capacities.
Instead, a creative process involves a complex of cognitive capacities and skills. An architecture of creative cognition would begin to identify the possible roles, structures, and relationships that compose that complexity.
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